ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The Norwegian Energy Act, which came into force in 1991, stated that transmission and distribution (T&D) should be optimised from a socio-economic point of view. From 1997 the T&D companies have been regulated according to a revenue cap model [1] [2] [3] . The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE), the national electricity regulator, decides each company's maximum revenue. The initial revenue caps take into consideration the historical level of costs of operations, maintenance and investments for each company, measured as an average of 1994 and 1995. The relative cost efficiency in 1994/1995, the development of the consumer price index and the expected increase in energy supplied decide the annual development of the caps. Since the regulator decides the maximum revenues, the companies can only increase their profits by reducing their costs. And since the companies do not have to take into consideration the customers' interruption costs, they will presumably reduce their internal costs to a level below the socioeconomic optimum. ("Customer" is in this context understood as "end-use customer").
REGULATION OF QUALITY OF SUPPLY
From 2001 NVE introduced quality dependent revenue caps (the CENS arrangement), a model for incentive based regulation of supply quality. The revenue caps will be dependent on the development of the quality of supply in such a way that the companies will be better off by balancing their internal costs and quality of supply towards a socio-economic optimum.
The CENS arrangement takes into account all incidents (both forced outages and planned disconnection) in all grid components > 1 kV that result in interruptions of duration > 3 minutes. Other quality elements may be included in the future.
Based on estimates of energy not supplied (ENS) and average specific interruption costs (c) for each customer category, interruption costs (IC) are calculated for each company annually (Eq. 1). The specific interruption costs differ depending on customer category and whether the interruption is notified or not.
where
= average specific interruption costs [NOK/kWh ENS] n = customer category m = notified interruptions, non-notified interruptions ENS is estimated as the amount of energy that would have been supplied to the customers if the interruption did not occur. According to the Electricity Network Regulations [2] energy not supplied has to be estimated in a standardised way using the FASIT concept (Fault And Supply Interruption information Tool), which has been used in the Norwegian power industry since 1995 [4] . The average specific costs are calculated from a series of customer surveys [5] supplied with information about average interruption duration and general price increases since the accomplishment of the surveys in 1991 [6] . The average specific costs, c, that are used in the arrangement are decided by the regulator. Although the companies from 2000 have been reporting ENS for up to 26 different customer categories defined by Statistics Norway, the customers are aggregated into two groups in the CENS arrangement. This is mainly due to lack of information about the specific interruption costs for several categories. One group contains residential and agricultural customers and the other group the industrial and commercial customers. The average interruption duration in Norway is 2 hours [7] , and based on this the average specific costs are fixed as in Table 1 . 
E(IC) = Expected interruption cost [NOK] E(ENS) = Expected ENS [kWh]
c, n and m as in Equation 1.
At the end of each year NVE will calculate the difference between expected and actual IC (Eq. 3). If the difference is positive, i.e. the quality of supply has been better than expected, the difference will be added to the company's revenue cap. The difference will be subtracted from the revenue caps if the quality has been worse than expected.
where dR = change in revenue cap Since the T&D tariffs are set by the company at the beginning of the year and the calculation in Eq. (3) is done ex post, there will be a deviation between allowed and actual revenues. This deviation is treated as a windfall loss or profit, i.e. an interest bearing account receivable from or debt to the customers. The receivables may be collected from the customers through higher tariffs in the subsequent years; the debt has to be paid back to the customers through lower tariffs in the subsequent years.
The CENS arrangement do not imply any direct compensation to the affected customers, but for large customers (> 400 MWh per year) an agreement of individual compensation can be made between the company and the customer if that certain customer's specific interruption costs is estimated. This value will then replace the average interruption cost fixed by the regulator. Whether the compensation is directly paid to the affected customer or is paid through a general reduction of allowed revenues does not influence the incentives in the regulation model of T&D. A direct compensation will however result in increased tariffs and in increased fluctuation in the companies' liquidity.
The introduction of CENS will initially lower the revenue cap for those companies with a quality of supply below the average and increase it for those with a quality above the average. Since the E(IC) is fixed, it follows from Eq. (3) that the increase/decrease in revenues in the future only depends on the development of IC. Any permanent increase in the quality of supply, i.e. reduction of IC, will result in increased revenues. A permanent decrease in quality will result in reduced revenues. This is expressed in Equation 4 .
The socio-economic costs of T&D, Eq. (5), are the sum of the company's specific costs of capital, operation and maintenance and of the customer interruption costs. Minimising Eq. (5) gives that the company should level operations, maintenance and investments so that a marginal increase in the firm specific costs equals a marginal reduction in customer specific interruption costs, Eq. (6). In the short run capital costs are not variable. This implies that CC´= 0 and that only the marginal costs of operation and maintenance matters. A profit maximising company will maximise Eq. (7) giving the first order conditions in Eq. (8) . From Eq. (4), (6) and (8) it follows that a profit maximising company acts according to the conditions for the socio-economic optimum. We also see that regulating the companies' revenue caps gives the same result as if they paid a direct financial compensation to the affected customers equal to their interruption costs.
where C = socio-economic costs VC = costs of operation and maintenance CC = cost of capital IC = customer specific interruption costs Π = company profit R = revenue and ´ indicates marginal costs/revenues
PERMANENT SHIFT IN QUALITY OF SUPPLY
The long-term effect of CENS is illustrated graphically in Figure 1 . The figure gives examples of different developments in revenues, company specific costs, profits and the customer interruption costs (IC). The bar to the left, A, illustrates the revenue cap before the introduction of CENS. The cap covers company specific costs (bottom) and profits (middle). Following a set of tariff regulations outlined in [2] the companies have a certain degree of freedom to decide tariffs as long as their revenue does not exceed the revenue cap, in our example 100 units. On top of bar A is the expected customer interruption costs, E(IC), decided initially by the regulator (20 units in this example).
If CENS should be replaced by a pure compensation arrangement, the revenues, and hence the tariffs, would have to be increased by an amount equal to E(IC) even though the quality of supply is unchanged. The expected profit would be as before since the expected compensation to customers would increase equal to E(IC) as well. CENS, without any direct compensation, would imply that the tariffs increase only if there is a permanent increase in the quality of supply and decrease only if the quality decreases on a permanent basis. However, since the companies can establish individual compensation arrangements with large customers, minor changes in the tariffs may occur.
In bar B -G we have replaced E(IC) with IC. In B -D the quality of supply has increased so that the interruption costs have been reduced with 10 units. The company will be allowed to increase its tariffs in such a way that the revenue increase with 10 units as well. In E -G the quality of supply has been reduced. The interruption costs have increased with 10 units. The company has to reduce its tariffs so that the revenue decreases with 10 units. The conclusion is that a change in customer specific interruption costs leads to change in revenue with the same amount.
In B and E we see that the profit (white area) has increased at the same time as the socio-economic costs (sum of shaded areas) have been reduced. These are situations that both the regulator and the regulated company want to achieve. In B the company has done efforts to increase the quality of supply by spending less money than the customers gain from it through reduced interruption costs. In E the company has increased its' efficiency by reducing costs. This cost reduction has lead to lower quality of supply, but the customers' interruption costs increased less than the reduction in the company specific costs.
In D and G the profit has decreased at the same time as the socio-economic costs have increased. Neither the regulator nor the regulated firm wants these situations. Although the quality has increased in D the company has spent more money on this marginal quality increase than the customers gain from it. In G the company is more efficient than before, but the firm specific cost reduction is less than the increased customer interruption costs.
In C and F the socio-economic costs are at the same level as in A. From an economic point of view the regulator should be indifferent between these three situations. A pure profit maximising company will be indifferent too, but if it has preferences for high quality more than for low tariffs it will prefer B to A and F. If low tariffs are more important than quality it will go for F.
We can therefore say that a rise in quality of supply always gives higher revenue and tariffs, but a regulated company will not increase the quality if it costs more than the customers will gain from it through reduced interruption costs. A decrease in quality may be profitable for a company, but it will only reduce the quality if its internal costs decrease more than the interruption costs increase. 
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Firm specific cost Profit IC E(IC) Figure 2 . The short-term effect of CENS due to stochastic variations in quality of supply.
STOCHASTIC VARIATIONS IN ENS
ENS and hence IC can fluctuate considerably from year to year, particularly in areas with tough climatic conditions. The companies are not allowed to change their tariffs if the deviation between E(IC) and IC is only due to stochastic fluctuations. Keeping the tariffs on a steady level will give an unchanged liquidity, although the operating result fluctuates. A year with customer interruption costs that deviates from E(IC) will appear in the balance sheet as an account receivable or a debt. This receivable/debt should not be collected from / paid back to the customers because it will be wiped out by it self over time. The tariffs should be changed only if the company's expectations of the future interruption costs deviates from E(IC) decided by the regulator. The short-term effect of CENS due to stochastic variations is illustrated in Figure 2 .
In Figure 2 the revenue cap before CENS is introduced is illustrated at the bottom of bar 0 (100 units). At the top of the bar E(IC) is set to 20 units. Bar 1-5 illustrate the development in the 5 subsequent years. Below the zero-level of the chart are the accumulated receivables due to CENS. If we assume that E(IC) is true, we know that in the long run all effects of CENS will be wiped out by keeping the tariffs unchanged so that the revenue levels 100.
In the first year the quality of supply is better than expected. IC is 5 units (shaded area on top), i.e. 15 units less than E(IC). Since the tariffs are unchanged this leads to an account receivable of 15 units. The second year E(IC) -IC = 10 units, which gives 25 units accumulated receivables. The third and fourth years are better than expected as well, and the receivables accumulate to 50 units. The fifth year the quality is much worse than expected. E(IC) -IC = -50 units, which isolated seen leads to a debt to the customers of 50 units. In this example this debt is equal to the accumulated account receivables from the four preceding years and the net effect of CENS after five years is therefore zero.
If the net effect is zero, why bother? If E(IC) represents the true optimum level of quality of supply, then CENS should have no effect. The companies should not have incentives to move away from optimum. But, the regulator will never have enough information to calculate the optimal level for each company. The decided E(IC) is only a starting point to ensure that the operating result of the companies is not drastically changed. The companies themselves will be able to evaluate likelihood for incidents that cause interruptions, the costs and effects of investments, operations and maintenance and so on, which is needed to find the optimum. The size of E(IC) will not influence the incentives in the arrangement. As seen in figure 2 the companies will move away from E(IC) if they believe that it is not the optimum, up or down, dependent on whether they have a quality above or below optimum.
CONCLUSIONS
A model for incorporating quality of supply issues in the regulation of the Norwegian network companies is presented in this paper. The arrangement is called CENS and came into force from 1 January 2001. It implies that the companies' revenue caps are regulated according to the actual quality of supply to their customers. The main objective of CENS is to give the network companies incentives to plan, operate and maintain their networks in a socio-economic optimal way, taking into account customer interruption costs in addition to investment costs, costs of electrical losses and operation and maintenance costs. The arrangement is based on energy not supplied (for interruptions of duration > 3 minutes) for medium/high voltage customers and at the distribution transformer level, together with average specific interruption costs for 2 customer groups (residential/agricultural and industrial/commercial). The arrangement also differentiates between notified interruptions and interruptions without advance notification.
The consequences of the arrangement are that a longterm rise in quality of supply will give higher revenue and tariffs, but a regulated company will not increase the quality if it costs more than the customers will gain from it through reduced interruption costs. A decrease in quality may on the other hand be profitable for a company, but it will only reduce the quality if its internal costs decrease more than the interruption costs increase.
